After Copenhagen: the impossibility of carbon trading by Campbell, David et al.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719643. 
© David Campbell, Matthias Klaes, and Christopher Bignell. Users may download and/or 
print one copy to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. Users may not 
engage in further distribution of this material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
other form of commercial gain. 
 
 
 
After Copenhagen: 
The Impossibility of Carbon Trading 
 
 
 
David Campbell, Matthias Klaes, 
and Christopher Bignell 
 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 22/2010 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 
 
  
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=[number]. 
 
 
After Copenhagen:  
The Impossibility of  Carbon Trading 
 
 
 
David Campbell, Matthias Klaes, and Christopher Bignell * 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The attempt to develop international cap and trade markets for anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, ultimately aiming to determine a global price for carbon, is the most 
extensive attempt ever made to use market-mimicking mechanisms to deal with an 
environmental externality. Addressed to the problem of climate change, it is an exercise in the 
adjustment of the social welfare function on a global scale, and it envisages expenditures which 
will run into trillions of dollars. Focusing on the operation of the Clean Development 
Mechanism, the most important of the three flexible mechanisms for carbon trade established 
under the Kyoto Protocol, it will be argued that carbon trading which will reduce emissions in 
line with any of the targets set for avoiding dangerous anthropological interference is 
impossible. Climate change negotiations have completely failed to place a cap on global 
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emissions; indeed, they have given a legal permission to increase them. Reflecting the fatal 
shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, the operation of the CDM so far has not merely failed to 
secure reductions, but in all likelihood has actually increased the absolute level of emissions. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Described as a passage ‘From Hopenhagen to Fiascohagen in 12 dire days’ by Mr 
Jonathan Porritt, one of the UK’s most prominent environmental activists,1 the 
UN Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen from 7-18 December 2009 
(COP15)2 is widely held to have been a failure. The Conference would have ended 
entirely without agreement had not a self-selecting group of five countries acted 
outside agreed COP15 negotiating procedures,3 indeed initially without UN 
involvement at all, to produce The Copenhagen Accord (CA),4 a very general 
document of no legal status,5 to which no country, certainly not those which 
initially produced it, has made a significant commitment. 
In this paper we will analyse the most important aspect of this failure for 
understanding current developments in the scale, scope, and technique of 
international regulatory theory and practice. The environmental economic 
intervention that has now met with failure in Copenhagen, ‘carbon trading’ under 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP),6 is the first major exercise in what we will call the 
‘new global welfare economics’, in which the welfare economics that has 
dominated national economic and social policy in the twentieth century has been 
extended to a global scope and scale. As every country’s anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contribute to the atmospheric concentration of 
                                                     
1 J. Porritt, ‘Selling a Low-carbon Life Just Got Harder’ The Times (21 December 2009), at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6963387.ece.  
2 This acronym denotes that Copenhagen is the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, entered into force 21 
March 1994, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Since COP11 in Montreal in 
2005, COPs have been held in conjunction with Meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. COP15 
was MOP5, and so it is sometimes referred to as COP15/MOP5 or CMP15, ie the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties. 
3 These were the USA plus the ‘BASIC’ bloc formed by Brazil, South Africa (Afrique du Sud), India, and 
the PRC. This bloc seems to be developing a common policy towards climate change after the CA. K 
Mackenzie, ‘Statement by the BASIC Ministers’ Financial Times Energy Source Blogs (25 January 2010), at  
http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/01/25/statement-by-the-basic-ministers/. 
4 COP15, Draft Decision -/CP15: The Copenhagen Accord (FCCC/CP/2009/l.7, 18 December 2009), at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 
5 Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC Secretariat, Clarification Relating to the Notification of 18 January 2010 
(FCCC/DBO/drl, 25 January 2010), at 
http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/100125_noti_clarification.p
df. 
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 1997, 2303 UNTS 
148, entered into force 16 February 2005, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.  
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GHG,7 of its technological nature global warming is the paradigm case of an 
‘international’ or ‘global externality’, and it has called for, and received, a global 
response based on the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).8 But though a welfare economic intervention which is in one sense 
familiar, carbon trading must be placed in the context of the changes to national 
regulatory technique made in response to the neo-classical revolution of the 1970s, 
in which command and control has been largely replaced by market-mimicking 
forms of regulation which are traced to the work of Ronald Coase. The new global 
welfare economics conceive of carbon trading as a global market-mimicking 
response to a global externality. 
Our analysis of this major development in regulation leads to a very 
disquieting conclusion. Carbon trading which will lead to a reduction in global 
GHG emissions is, and has been from the outset, an impossibility. As COP15 
began to make clear, the first major exercise in the new global welfare economics 
was bound to be a complete failure, and continued attempts to implement it are 
irrational. Certain reflections on how a major policy so completely defective can 
be adopted will be put forward. 
 
 
 
THE KP AND THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
 
The explanation of environmental pollution as an externality is conterminous with 
the history of modern welfare economics. Pigou’s first example of the negative 
externality in The Economics of Welfare was factory smoke,9 and he remained 
concerned with environmental matters throughout his life. A famous and 
characteristic work in the Pigouvian tradition, Kapp’s, The Social Costs of Private 
Enterprise, used the externality argument to show pollution to be an immense social 
cost in the capitalist countries.10 In this tradition, but carrying it on to an actually 
global scope and scale, climate change takes its place as, in the words of the Stern 
Review (SR), the influential review of climate change led by Sir Nicholas Stern for 
                                                     
7 By far the most important gas causing the ‘greenhouse effect’ is water vapour, but, of course, the bulk 
of water vapour is not produced by human activity. A proper understanding of global warming must start 
from the fact that, without the greenhouse effect, average temperatures would be perhaps 20 degrees 
Celsius lower, and the development of human civilisation as we know it would have been impossible. 
DAI is a marginal change, an ‘enhanced greenhouse effect’. 
8 n 2 bove. 
9 A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1952 ed, 2002), 184. This 
passage is essentially taken from A.C. Pigou, Wealth and Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1912), 159. The 
common terminology of welfare economics which we shall use here, including the externality, is largely 
not to be found in The Economics of Welfare, but is of more recent coinage. 
10 K.W. Kapp, The Social Costs of Private Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). After 
realising that the communist economies were certainly no better, Kapp reworked this book as The Social 
Costs of Business Enterprise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Kapp’s difficulties in this respect 
obviously also beset the IPCC, which applies the externality argument to all the world’s economies, 
including those that have little or no independent private sector, of which the PRC arguably still remains 
the most important example. But the point cannot be taken up here as the welfare economics of climate 
change policy simply are not sophisticated enough to sustain the discussion.  
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the UK Treasury, ‘the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen’.11 
Industrialisation has been based on the emission particularly of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), and so, from the environmental welfare economics perspective, the 
essential character of the modern world created by capitalism is based on the 
production of an externality.12 In the more high-flown contributions to the debate, 
the mitigation of global warming is seen as an important part of a fundamental 
‘civilisation’ of markets.13 Against this background, carbon trading is the first truly 
global result of the development of a capacity to engage in international welfare 
economic intervention which has been strongly promoted by the UN since it 
sponsored an influential collection of papers on ‘global public goods’ in 1999.14 
The argument for treating anthropogenic GHG emissions as a negative 
externality, as it is made out in the SR’s representative thinking,15 is now so much 
a part of the normal worldview, not only of policy-makers but of the informed 
public, such as those with environmental concerns, as to need only the briefest 
rehearsal here. When making an investment decision according to the criterion of 
profitability, private investors analytically seek returns in excess of the costs of 
their investment. They will take such costs as have a price and so feature within 
their private accounting horizon into account when making their decision. But 
certain costs will not have a price because the investor has no contractual 
                                                     
11 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1. Sir Nicholas 
has presented a somewhat revised version of his views in a more readily accessible form in N. Stern, A 
Blueprint for a Safer Planet (London: Bodley Head, 2009). This statement largely incorporates Sir Nicholas’ 
later belief that the SR significantly underestimated the costs of failure to reduce GHG emissions.  
12 In the global warming economic literature, this issue has largely been discussed in terms of assessing 
the claimed correlation between growth and a reduction of polluting activity per unit of growth known as 
the environmental Kuznets curve. G. Grossman and A. Kreuger, ‘Economic Growth and the 
Environment’ (1995) 110 Quarterly Journal of Economics 353. 
13 M. Callon, ‘Civilizing Markets: Carbon Trading Between in vitro and in vivo Experiments’ (2009) 34 
Accounting, Organisations and Society 535. For Mr Porritt’s contribution to this strophe, see J. Porritt, 
Capitalism as if the World Matters (London: Earthscan, 2005).  
14 I. Kaul, et al (eds), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). The editors were officers of UNDP. On the UNDP web page promoting the 
book, the then UN Secretary General says the following: ‘It is not beyond the power of political volition 
to tip the scales towards a more secure peace, greater economic well-being, social justice and 
environmental sustainability. But no country can achieve these global public goods on its own, and 
neither can the global marketplace. Thus our efforts must now focus on global public goods’, at 
http://www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods.  That the authors of this book were anxious to be seen to 
move away from command and control to a position claimed to be based on Coase is emphasised by a 
link on this webpage to Coase’s famous critique of a core argument for the provision of public goods in 
his essay on ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’: R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 187. 
15 SR, sec 2.2. The SR has come under very substantial criticism, not only from those who challenge its 
reliance on the IPCC physical science basis and its economic case for climate change mitigation, eg N. 
Lawson, An Appeal to Reason (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2008), but from those who essentially share 
its basic position, which they believe it argues badly; eg an extremely strongly worded 2006 review of the 
SR by Professor Richard Tol, a leading member of IPCC Working Parties responsible for influential 
climate change modelling, led to a heated exchange culminating in G. Yohe and R. Tol, ‘The Stern 
Review and the Economics of Climate Change: An Editorial Essay’ (2008) 89 Climatic Change 231. But 
that the SR is the single most important welfare economic argument for the KP is indisputable, and we 
concentrate on it for that reason. 
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relationship in respect of those costs with those who bear them. These social costs 
are real, but external to the market, and so play no part in a private investment 
decision, which may well, then, be wrong from a social perspective which takes all 
private and social costs into account. For Pigou, factory smoke was a clear 
example of an externality because those harmed by it had no contractual 
relationship with the factory owner in respect of that harm, which therefore was 
uncompensated. The SR represents a very influential body of opinion which 
believes anthropogenic GHG emissions to be a similarly clear example at a global 
scope and scale. The KP attempted to cap the developed countries’ anthropogenic 
GHG emissions at certain ‘assigned amounts’ (AAs). Tradable credits are issued 
for reductions under the cap, which those wishing to emit in excess of the cap 
must purchase in order to do so, the possibility of sale and the necessity of 
purchase giving the emissions caught in this way a ‘shadow’ price (their market 
price being zero) which brings them within the accounting horizon of emitters and 
leads to carbon trading. 
Though the externality argument is Pigouvian, this ‘cap and trade’ argument 
for carbon trading is not. The typical Pigouvian forms of intervention - public 
ownership or very direct regulation, taxation, and payments of bounties – are 
closely associated with command and control. But almost every work of 
theoretical substance,16 or pretension on carbon trading, makes reference to 
Coase’s ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, which is identified as the fons et origo of 
market-mimicking as a fundamental improvement upon command and control as 
the basic form of regulatory technique. The SR identifies four possible ‘ways in 
which negative externalities can be approached’, the first three of which are of 
direct relevance to the analysis of the KP mechanisms. (The fourth, in essence 
global public ownership, is set aside as ‘clearly not a practical option’).17 The first 
approach is taxation of the action causing the externality, the second is ‘quantity 
restrictions’ which ‘limit the volume of emissions [...] using a command and 
control approach’, and the third is the allocation of ‘a full set of property rights [...] 
among those causing the externality and / or those affected [...] which can 
underpin bargaining or trading’. This third approach is based on the authority of a 
reference to ‘Coase (1960)’, ie to ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. Cap and trade 
systems are analysed as a combination of the second and third approaches: 
 
They control the overall quantity of emissions, by establishing binding 
emissions commitments. Within this quantity ceiling, entities covered by the 
scheme – such as firms, countries or individuals – are then free to choose 
how best – and where – to deliver emissions reductions within the scheme.18  
 
                                                     
16 From within the legal scholarship, we would like to point to the excellent work of David Driesen as a 
counterpoint to our own position: eg ‘Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun 
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal 21. 
17 SR, 353 n 4. 
18 ibid, 353. 
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This confidence in cap and trade is a product of the ‘reconceiving’ of the 
technique of the ‘re-regulatory state’ during the ‘age of regulatory reform’ we have 
experienced over the past 40 years. Rather than attempt to intervene using the 
direct mechanisms advocated by Pigou, the national state and international 
agencies, having identified stabilisation of global warming as a public good but 
despairing of an adequate regulatory response based on traditional command and 
control, notably the impossibility of imposing biting carbon taxes,19 seek to 
produce that public good by constructing a ‘quasi-market’ which will lead to 
market-mimicking behaviour. Such use of quasi-markets has become the basic 
regulatory technique of the ‘new public management’ adopted by national 
governments throughout the developed world. The KP climate change mitigation 
strategy is one of market-mimicking at a global scope and scale, and as such 
embodies the regulatory technique of the new global welfare economics. In the 
words of Ms Christiana Figueres, whose recent appointment as Executive 
Secretary of the UNFCCC Secretariat will be discussed below, and Mr Ken 
Newcombe, another highly influential participant in the creation of carbon trading 
markets: ‘[t]he Protocol market mechanisms are [...] the first ever attempt of the 
United Nations to create and regulate a global commodity, a responsibility 
otherwise squarely in the hands of the private sector’.20 
We wish to avoid discussion of the plausibility of the ‘physical science basis’ 
of global warming, which we will accept so far as possible.21 Through its 
exhaustive, continuously revised compilations of this science,22 which involve the 
international engagement of thousands of scientists and extensive global 
promotional and lobbying activities, a UN agency, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), has managed to establish a ‘scientific consensus’ that 
‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ (DAI) with the global climate is taking 
place. Amongst a range of predictions, it is claimed that, if anthropogenic GHG 
                                                     
19 n 133 below. 
20 C. Figueres and K. Newcombe, Evolution of the CDM: Toward 2012 and Beyond (London: Climate Change 
Capital Ltd, 2007), 1, at http://www.climatechangecapital.com/media/articles-and-papers/evolution-of-
the-cdm.aspx.  
21 Objectivity in this incredibly vexed area requires us, however, to state our position, that, whilst we are, 
to varying degrees, persuaded that global warming is taking place, we think it is most unwise to place the 
amount of confidence in the claims made in the physical science basis about its extent or its nature that is 
being placed on it in the economic policy debate, because the issues are far too difficult to admit of their 
description with anything remotely like the necessary certainty or precision. We all find the very idea of 
‘consensus science’ to be simultaneously a rather silly and a repugnantly authoritarian representation of 
the actual practice of scientific research. For a recent review of the evidence which, though it gravely 
underestimates mensuration error in our view, strives to be objective, see Royal Society, Climate Change: A 
Summary of the Science (September 2010), at http://royalsociety.org/climate-change-summary-of-science. 
22 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
Since 1990, the IPCC has produced four Assessment Reports addressing all the physical and human aspects 
of climate change. The Fourth Assessment Report will be replaced by a fifth to be published in 2013. Since 
2007, there have been, and will be, many ratchetings up of the ‘reasons for concern’ that will feed into the 
Fifth Assessment physical science report: eg J.B. Smith, et al, ‘Assessing Dangerous Climate Change 
through an Update of the IPCC “Reasons for Concern”’ (17 March 2009) 106(11) Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science of the USA 4133.  
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emissions continue to rise on current trends, global mean surface temperatures 
will rise by more than four degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels by the end of 
this century, and the dangerous environmental effects of this are variously 
described by the IPCC in a number of ‘emissions scenarios’.23 The response to this 
is to seek to limit anthropogenic GHG emissions, and therefore atmospheric 
GHG concentration, at a level which will curb the warming effect. 
The UNFCCC’s own emissions target is set out in art 2 in the most general, 
indeed tautological, terms of stabilisation at levels which prevent DAI. The KP 
gave some effect to the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ necessary for 
‘an effective and appropriate international response’ to climate change which are 
established in the preamble to the UNFCCC, but in a way which takes only a very 
limited step towards setting concrete targets. As all countries emit GHGs to some 
extent, the responsibility for anthropogenic GHG emissions is common, but the 
UNFCCC clearly placed real responsibility, both in the sense of historical blame 
for global warming and in the sense of now doing most about it, on the developed 
countries,24 which were listed in Annex I. Under KP, art 3, para 1, essentially the 
same parties, identified in KP Annex B, accepted caps on their AAs which should 
have led to an at least five per cent average reduction of their anthropogenic GHG 
emissions from, for most countries, 1990 base levels by the end of a First 
Commitment Period (FCP) which will end in 2012.  
This five per cent target is, in a strong sense, a random figure, for it is not 
related to necessary reductions in global anthropogenic GHG emissions in any 
rational way.25 No link between this target and the prevention of DAI has been or, 
as we shall see, could be drawn. The global target, for which the EU has since 
strongly argued in light of revised IPCC calculations about the danger posed by 
various concentrations of GHG,26 is a reduction of global emissions such that 
warming will be limited to a two degrees Celsius increase over pre-industrial 
temperatures,27 and the CA, para 1, has adopted this target. As we have said, we 
wish so far as possible to avoid discussion of the physical science basis of global 
warming, but we must note here that identifying the concentration of GHG that 
will prevent DAI identified with the two degrees Celsius target is very widely 
agreed to be exceptionally difficult. There may be a consensus over global 
warming, but, on this vital point, policymaking is, in our opinion, undermined 
                                                     
23 IPCC, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). This Report is 
based on data collected for the Third Assessment Report.  
24 UNFCCC, art 3, para 1. The Annex I parties included the then European Economic Community in its 
own right, and, though understandable, this may well have made European GHG emissions policy more 
difficult because it created a ‘bubble’ of emissions, regulatory responsibility for which was shared, or 
contested, between the 15 countries and the then European Community which were signatories to the 
KP.  
25 W. Nordhaus and J. Boyer, ‘Requiem for Kyoto: An Economic Analysis’ (1999) 20 Energy Journal Special 
Issue 93, 125.  
26 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
box 13.7. 
27 EU Climate Change Expert Group, The 2°C Target, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/brochure_2c.pdf. 
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because it just cannot be said what the consensus is about.28 The target reduction 
has been set at numerous different levels and is under constant revision 
(particularly in response to the uncertainty left by COP15). The European 
Commission has determined that the EU should reduce its anthropogenic GHG 
emissions by at least 20 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020, and by between 80 per 
cent and 95 per cent by 2050, in order to achieve the two degrees Celsius target,29 
and the UK has given statutory expression to reductions in line with this extremely 
ambitious target in the Climate Change Act 2008, s 1.  
On the current industrial technology particularly of energy production,30 even 
the KP Annex 1 reductions of five per cent would impose immense costs,31 and, 
concerned, inter alia, about these costs, the USA, then the world’s largest emitter 
and by far the single largest Annex I emitter, undermined the KP from the start by 
refusing to ratify it. This really was in itself enough to make the Annex I FCP 
target unachievable, but, fundamentally because of a similar unwillingness to bear 
these costs, the other Annex I countries had overall pursued the KP targets they 
had accepted in, to put it politely, half-hearted ways which have failed to set biting 
caps,32 and as a whole these countries were not on course to achieve their FCP 
                                                     
28 M.R. Allen, et al, ‘Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon Emissions towards the Trillionth Tonne’ 
(30 April 2009) 458(7242) Nature 1163: ‘[g]lobal efforts to mitigate climate change are guided by 
projections of future temperatures. But the eventual equilibrium global mean temperature associated with 
a given stabilization level of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remains uncertain, complicating 
the setting of stabilization targets to avoid potentially dangerous levels of global warming’.  
29 EC, International Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen: Acting Now to Reinvigorate Global Action on Climate Change 
(COM(2010) 86 final, 9 March 2010), at  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/com_2010_86.pdf A recent attempt to move to the 30 per 
cent reduction allowed for under the EU’s commitment to the CA led by the new UK Climate Change 
Minister has been rejected at EU level. M. McCarthy, ‘Huhne Presses EU on Raising Emissions Targets’ 
The Independent (12 June 2010), at 
http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=ODczNzMxMg%3D%3D. 
30 The IPCC’s treatment of the macroeconomic significance of the technological frontier is largely based 
on its depiction as one of four macro-economic ‘drivers’ (and therefore possible policy ‘levers’) 
determining GHG emissions levels in a formula called the ‘Kaya identity’ after its developer, Professor 
Yoichi Kaya. IPCC, n 23 above, ch 2. On possible (or otherwise) significant changes to the technological 
frontier, see M.I. Hoffert, et al, ‘Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a 
Greenhouse Planet’ (2002) 298(5595) Science 981. 
31 UNDESA has recently reviewed the various estimates of these costs, which range from zero point two 
per cent to two per cent of the entire world’s GDP per annum. UNDESA, World Economic and Social Survey 
2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet (New York: UN, 2009), 154-155. Every such estimate we have 
examined seems unacceptably speculative and low. We are in an area where policy formulation is possible 
only by means of what may be the most marked example ever of the ‘extravagant and exaggerated use’ of 
inevitably defective economic data against which Morgenstern warned us in his seminal work on the 
accuracy of such data. O. Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2nd ed, 1963), 303. 
32 Phase I of EUETS was marked by a collapse almost to zero of the price of permits issued under it, the 
result of the issuance of far more permits by governments scared of affecting growth to emitters than the 
emitters needed for business as usual, which, of course, eliminates the cap and thereby the scarcity of the 
permissions. Influential opinion about this undeniable farce has been that this was a valuable lesson of 
Phase I of EUETS from which future policymaking should learn. But it proved politically impossible in 
Phase II to avoid the ‘grandfathering’ of permits which had led to their excessive allocation in Phase I, 
and, prior to the current depression (n 34 below), it seemed extremely highly likely that Phase II, which is 
to end conterminously with the FCP, will have the same result as Phase I. Environmental Audit 
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reductions prior to the current depression.33 Significant reductions between 1990 
to 2007 can solidly (but by no means uncontroversially) be identified in the post-
communist countries, but these are attributable to the declines in the levels of 
overall economic activity these countries suffered during their difficult transitions, 
and the resumption of growth had put them on a course to more than nullify these 
reductions. Emissions in the advanced capitalist Annex I countries increased by at 
least 11 per cent between 1990 and 2007. The position left by the current 
depression cannot reliably be assessed as this is written,34 but we can ignore this 
for the problem is dealing with Annex 1 emissions given the growth targets to 
which Annex 1 countries typically aspire, and are now doing all they can to restore. 
For reasons which will emerge, it is even more important to note that certain 
developing countries have greatly increased their emissions, and in particular that 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increased its emissions by 160 per cent over 
this period. In sum, from 1990-2007, global anthropogenic GHG emissions 
actually rose by over 40 per cent. Stated at its briefest, this extreme ‘compliance 
gap’ means that, prior to the depression, the Annex 1 countries were not on 
course to meet their FCP target, and the global situation was on course to have 
very substantially worsened. 
The KP established three market-mimicking emissions trading schemes 
known as the ‘flexible mechanisms’.35 The ‘Emissions Trading’ mechanism 
established under KP, art 17, and the ‘Joint Implementation’ mechanism 
established under art 6 envisage project development and trade within Annex I 
countries. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under KP, art 
12, is the flexibility mechanism which embraces the developing countries, 
including the PRC, India, and Brasil. Under the CDM, a ‘project developer’ 
proposes a ‘carbon project’ in a ‘host’ developing country which it is intended will 
                                                                                                                                       
Committee, Fourth Report: The Role of Carbon Markets in Preventing Dangerous Climate Change (2009-2010) (HC 
290). The failure of Phase I was described and an, it seems, accurate prediction of the failure of Phase II 
was made in Open Europe, Europe’s Dirty Secret: Why the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Isn’t Working 
(London: Open Europe, 2007), at http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/etsp2.pdf. Though ending 
on what seems a ritualistic positive note, the appraisal of the EU climate change policy by Dieter Helm, 
Professor of Energy Policy at Oxford and a senior government advisor committed to climate change 
mitigation, seems to us very fair. D. Helm, ‘EU Climate-Change Policy: A Critique’ in D. Helm and C. 
Hepburn (eds), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 222. In 
light of this, that there are great values traded on the EUETS (n 40 below) is enormously worrying, for it 
leads one to suspect there are no welfare-enhancing fundamentals underlying this trade. This is the kernel 
of sense in activist criticisms of a looming ‘carbon subprime’. S-J. Clifton, A Dangerous Obsession (London: 
Friends of the Earth, 2009), sec 3.4. 
33 UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-
2007 (FCCC/SBI/2009/12, 21 October 2009), at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/sbi/eng/12.pdf. GHG emissions data are extremely difficult to 
interpret, not only because of allowances which must be made for the enormous problems of collecting 
even the basic ‘physical’ data, but even more because of the labyrinthine and politically contested way 
those data are aggregated to produce baselines, targets, and reductions which have important policy 
implications. 
34 The latest UK position assessed by the CCC ascribes almost all of recent UK emissions reductions to 
the depression. CCC, Meeting Carbon Budgets: Ensuring a Low Carbon Recovery (2nd Progress Report, 30 June 
2010), at http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/progress-reports.  
35 See generally D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
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secure reductions in the projected anthropogenic GHG emissions of that country. 
After establishing a baseline of the emissions which would be caused by a 
proposed investment,36 a developer may seek approval of alterations to the 
investment which would reduce the emissions it would have caused. A UN 
agency, the CDM Executive Board (CDMEB), lays down mandatory 
methodologies for the design of various types of carbon project,37 oversees the 
approvals process, grants final approval to, and oversees the monitoring of carbon 
projects. Tradable ‘Certified Emissions Reductions’ (CERs), denominated in 
metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e),38 are issued for validated reductions. 
CERs may be used by ‘credit buyer’ public and private emitters in Annex I 
countries as ‘carbon credits’ to ‘offset’ their own reductions required by a 
domestic cap. The finance for the technological transfer and innovation that 
would so modify the investment as to reduce its emissions is to be obtained from 
sale of the CERs. In this way, it was intended that very substantial foreign 
investment in and transfer of ‘low carbon technology’ would take place, 
encouraging ‘sustainable development’ in non-Annex 1 countries. As this would 
be undertaken principally by private parties seeking to offset emissions in Annex I 
countries (or sell permissions to do this), ‘market forces’ would identify the most 
efficient ways of obtaining emissions reductions in non-Annex I countries in a 
beneficent process of ‘environmental entrepreneurship’. It was also intended that 
the secondary market which would emerge in CERs ultimately would be combined 
with other emissions markets around the world to establish a global carbon market 
on which a single price for carbon would eventually emerge.39 As the USA almost 
certainly will not play a part under the KP within the FCP, overwhelmingly the 
most significant market,40 for trade in CERs in Annex I countries, is the European 
Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS),41 under a Directive 
which links to the CDM to the EUETS.42 
It must be stressed that the KP imposed no caps on the non-Annex I 
‘developing’ countries, which were not required to make reductions within the 
                                                     
36 The basic methodologies contemplate a large scale industrial investment. Variations of these 
methodologies are made for other types of project. The requirements of the CDM approvals process 
have been relaxed for small-scale projects, which are thought not to be able to bear their cost, and this is 
very troubling indeed in light of the history of the operation of the CDM discussed below. We fear this 
will prove to be more or less a license for opportunistic action which will be tolerated so long as it is kept 
within small bounds. 
37 It is open to the developer of a project so innovative that it requires a novel methodology to propose 
such a methodology to the CDMEB. 
38 The significance of this unit is described in the text accompanying n 92 below. 
39 SR, ch 22. 
40 In 2008, the value traded on the EUETS was USD 92 billions, ie over 73 per cent of the total value of 
the transactions conducted on world carbon markets. K. Kapoor and P. Ambrosi, State and Trends of the 
World Carbon Market 2009 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2009), table 1.  
41 Directive 2003/87/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. As we have mentioned, the end of 
Phase II of the EUETS will coincide with the end of the KP SCP. For the EU’s intentions for Phase III 
after this, see EC, 20 20 by 2020: Europe's Climate Change Opportunity (COM(2008) 30 final, 23 January 
2008), at http://www.energy.eu/directives/com2008_0030en01.pdf.  
42 Directive 2004/101/EC. 
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FCP, and that nothing that has happened since has changed this. The UNFCCC 
seemed to contemplate an absolute growth in these countries’ emissions,43 to 
allow of their ‘economic development’,44 which is given explicit priority over 
reduction of anthropogenic GHG emissions,45 and the KP itself is silent about 
how those countries would ever contribute to the common responsibility in any 
substantial sense. Now, incredible as it first seems to say, the consequence of this 
is that the CDM cannot lead to any GHG reductions at all. A CER, denominated 
as one tonne of CO2e, is generated by a reduction in a non-Annex1 host. The 
CER will be used by an emitter in an Annex I country to emit a tonne of CO2e. It 
is this possibility that makes the purchase of the CER, and thus the financing of 
carbon projects, rational for parties in Annex I countries. The global position over 
emissions therefore will not be changed by a clearing CDM market, ie a market in 
which CERs are not hoarded. The KP imposes no limit to the activity which can 
go on in this way. The remarkable point which must be made is that, although 
discussion of the KP flexible mechanisms is typically conducted as a discussion of 
cap and trade markets, as it is throughout the SR,46 the CDM, unlike the other KP 
mechanisms, is not capped, and this means that the KP mechanisms as a whole 
are not capped. 
Even if the CDM worked, it could reduce only the ‘carbon intensity’ of 
economic activity in non-Annex 1 countries. This is the measure of the amount of 
anthropogenic GHG which must be emitted to increase gross domestic product 
(GDP),47 which indeed would be reduced by sustainable development financed 
under the CDM. But reduction in carbon intensity may be perfectly consistent 
with unbounded absolute growth in anthropogenic GHG emissions, and, in 
countries which are actually developing such as the PRC, it is, in a practical sense, 
inevitable that reduction in the former will be accompanied by growth in the latter. 
As old, more carbon intensive plant can be retired only gradually, extremely 
ambitious reductions in carbon intensity actually require a very substantial 
installation of new, less carbon intensive plant in order to lower the average 
carbon intensity of the whole economy by increasing overall GHG emissions. 
In these circumstances, the idea of there actually being a common but 
differentiated responsibility is completely undermined. The UNFCCC and the KP 
do not place a different responsibility on the non-Annex 1 countries. They place 
no responsibility whatsoever on them, and therefore there is no common 
responsibility as steps taken in recognition of any responsibility borne by the 
Annex 1 countries may well be entirely fruitless, for reductions in those countries 
may well be negated by increases in non-Annex 1 countries, as we will see has 
                                                     
43 UNFCCC, preamble. 
44 ibid, art 3, para 4. 
45 ibid, art 4, para 7, reads: ‘The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement 
their commitments under the Convention […] will take fully into account that economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country 
Parties.’ 
46 nb SR, 353. 
47 The literature contains other definitions of carbon intensity. 
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been the case. Overall emissions reductions can happen only if the non-Annex I 
countries also are subject to caps, for then trade between a host and a buyer 
becomes trade between two capped systems, and reductions will follow, in respect 
of the emissions caught and to the extent that market-mimicking works, in the 
optimal way. The extent to which it was initially envisaged that the common 
responsibility would eventually ‘evolve’ to impose substantial burdens on the non-
Annex I countries is a matter of contentious diplomatic history.48 Though the 
UNFCCC and the KP make no sense unless it was believed that the non-Annex I 
countries would eventually commit to reductions, and that the KP would make 
such commitment easier because those countries had been drawn in to carbon 
trading which would greatly reduce the cost of those reductions, there is nothing 
in either the Treaty or the Protocol to lead one to think this will happen; quite the 
contrary is in fact the case. 
This began to become undeniably clear when the 31 January 2010 deadline 
for notifications of reductions commitments to the CA passed without any 
meaningful result,49 other than the then Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat trying to put the bravest face on things, including by denying that 31 
January had ever been a deadline in the usual sense of the word at all,50 prior to 
himself resigning, having become identified with the failure of COP15.51 Of 
course, our description of these notifications as having no substantial content 
would by no means be conceded by those promoting the KP. Mr Ed Miliband, 
now the Leader of the UK Labour Party, in his former role as Secretary for the 
Environment and Climate Change under the previous Government, claimed that 
‘[j]ust one month after Copenhagen, countries accounting for nearly 80 per cent of 
global emissions have shown they’re pushing ahead with domestic action on 
climate change [with] the USA, China and India setting out what they will do’.52 
But, even if one puts aside the great difficulties of saying what any target 
means in this vexed area, none of these countries has made any sort of substantial 
commitment to reduce emissions. The USA’s statement is of a ‘target’ for 
reductions from a 2005, not 1990, baseline, and, not only is the start of pursuit of 
this target made explicitly conditional on other Annex I parties and the ‘more 
advanced’ non-Annex I parties making substantial commitments of just the sort 
they did not make at COP15, but the target itself is expressed in, in the words of 
its notification, ‘pending legislation’ that has little prospect of surviving Congress. 
                                                     
48 S. Oberthur and H. Ott, The Kyoto Protocol (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1999), sec 17.1.  
49 The notifications received by the UNFCCC Secretariat are available at 
http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php. 
50 J. Vidal, ‘UN Drops Deadline for Countries to State Climate Change Targets’ The Guardian (20 January 
2010), at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jan/20/copenhagen-accord-deadline-climate-change.  
51 J. Vidal, ‘Yvo De Boer's Successor has Big Footprints to Fill’ The Guardian (18 February 2010), at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/18/yvo-de-boer-successor-analysis. 
52 DECC, Ed Miliband Responds to Copenhagen Accord Deadline (Press Release, 2 February 2010), at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn2010_14/pn2010_14.aspx. 
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The USA’s notification is entirely representative of the weakness of Annex I 
notifications.53 
Leaving aside incidentals, the PRC’s notification is as follows:  
 
China will endeavour to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP 
by 40-45 per cent by 2020 compared to the 2005 level [...] Please note that the 
above-mentioned autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in 
nature and will be implemented in accordance with the principles and 
provisions of the UNFCCC, in particular Article 4, paragraph 7. 
 
To spell it out: this is a notification of a ‘voluntary’ ‘endeavour’ related to 2005, 
not a 1990, baseline, which is explicitly stated to be of no legal status. The 
notification is expressed in terms of carbon intensity and is entirely within the 
framework of the UNFCCC art 4, para 7, though we have seen that reduction in 
carbon intensity is perfectly reconcilable with, and almost certainly will mean, great 
growth in absolute anthropogenic GHG emissions, and that art 4, para 7, explicitly 
privileges economic growth over emissions reduction. India’s notification is more 
or less the same except that it enters even more reservations. The notifications of 
all other non-Annex I countries are in this vein. 
In sum, the best that can be said of Mr Miliband’s interpretation of the CA is 
that it is based on a persistent belief that COP16, due to start in Cancun, Mexico, 
in November 2010, will achieve what COP15, and the entire history of UNFCCC 
diplomacy, has not.54 But such a commitment reminds us of Einstein’s definition 
of insanity as doing the same thing over and over again in the expectation of 
different results, only in this case the repetition is extremely costly, and, in our 
opinion, the failure of COP15 marks the point where it no longer sensible to 
assert that the KP process has secured commitments to the caps needed to make 
the CDM work even in theory, though one would be foolish to think that the 
                                                     
53 Since this was written, J. Rogelj, et al, ‘Copenhagen Accord Pledges Are Paltry’ (2010) 464(7292) Nature 
1126, has passed a very critical verdict on the Annex 1 countries’ commitments to the CA, but it is not 
nearly critical enough, in our opinion, for it reads far too much into these pledges. It does, however, 
usefully criticise a number of commentaries on the CA, including by Sir Nicholas Stern, that put a gloss 
on CA notifications similar to Mr Miliband’s. 
54 N. Chestney, ‘Britain Confident of Climate Deal in Mexico’ Reuters (13 January 2010), at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE60C6JX20100113. It was inevitable that the UNFCCC has 
claimed that ‘important progress towards concluding what was left incomplete at [COP15]’ was made at 
the Bonn Climate Change talks held in June 2010, preparing the way for Cancun. UNFCCC, ‘Bonn 
Climate Change Talks Make Progress on Fleshing Out Specifics of Global Climate Change Regime’ 
(Press Release, 11 June 2010), at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20101106_pr
_closing_june.pdf. In our opinion, based on the so far limited official documentation and media 
accounts, no substantial progress whatsoever was made at these talks. Whilst this paper was being 
reviewed for publication, negotiations held in Tianjin, PRC as a preliminary to COP16 ended in further 
recrimination and it became clear that attempts would be made to revise down the COP16 agenda to 
minimise the embarrassment caused by the failure of the KP. L. Gray, ‘Global Warming Summit Heads 
for Failure Amid Snub By World Leaders’ The Daily Telegraph (11 October 2010), at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/8053853/Global-warming-
summit-heads-for-failure-amid-snub-by-world-leaders.html.  
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immense commitments which have already been made to carbon trading will be 
unwound with alacrity. The UNFCCC has met with great success in generating 
support for carbon trading from very powerful public and private interests,55 and 
the point at which the complete and irremediable failure of the KP is, as it were, 
officially acknowledged no doubt will be delayed long after the evidence of that 
failure is compelling. Nevertheless, without a cap on the non-Annex I countries, 
those countries present a theoretically unbounded extensive margin for an increase 
of emissions, with the limits in Annex I countries merely being relaxed in non-
Annex I countries, a problem commonly referred to as ‘carbon leakage’ from one 
country to another. Indeed, in an inversion of the argument for technology 
transfer, as CERs are ultimately priced by the value of the emission of a tonne of 
CO2e in a rich Annex I country, it is readily conceivable that the revenues from 
this will stimulate emissions in a poor non-Annex I country in a way which would 
not be possible were the underlying project to be funded from within that country, 
and we will see that highly persuasive evidence of this emerges from the operation 
of the CDM in the PRC.  
Despite all this, the CDM has been claimed to be a great success,56 which, in a 
diplomatic sense it indisputably has been. Since the first project registration on 18 
November 2004,57 the CDM has registered 2029 projects58 in 63 host countries,59 
with approximately 2500 projects in an approvals pipeline which has grown 
beyond all initial expectation.60 In 2008, the value of the CERs issued was 
estimated to be more than USD six point five billions, the transacted value on the 
CDM secondary market was USD 26 billions, and the total transacted value on the 
world emissions markets then established was USD 126 billions.61 Prior to the 
conclusion of COP15, the CDM was predicted to issue two point nine billion 
CERs by the end of the FCP.62 Undeniably, a large and growing market in a new 
financial instrument has been created. 
However, CER issuance and trade is still vestigial by comparison to the size 
of the problem to which it is addressed. Meeting any UNFCCC emissions target 
will require, in the words of the UN Secretary General, ‘a wholesale 
reconfiguration of global industry’,63 a ‘global transformation’ amounting to what 
                                                     
55 S. Boehmer-Christiansoen and A. Kellow, International Environmental Policy: Interests and the Failure of the 
Kyoto Process (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002). 
56 eg R. Purdy, ‘Governance Reform of the Clean Development Mechanism After Poznań’ (2009) 1 
Carbon and Climate Law Review 5. 
57 Many early projects have a CER issuance backdated to 1 January 2000 in recognition of the delays 
between the agreement of the KP and making CDM regulations and procedures operational.  
58 CDM website, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html. The UNEP Risø website maintains a 
more detailed pipeline analysis, at http://cdmpipeline.org/. 
59 CDM website, at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html. 
60 CDM website, n 58 above. 
61 Kapoor and Ambrosi, n 40 above, table 1. 
62 CDM website, n 58 above. 
63 UN Secretary General, ‘A New Green Economics’ (Press Rrelease, 3 December 2007), at 
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is commonly referred to as ‘a second industrial revolution’.64 And, indeed, a 
deliberate alteration of the basic nature of the entire energy economy, and 
therefore the entire economy, of the entire world is being attempted. On the basis 
of broadly the figures that led to the formulation of the two degrees Celsius target, 
in 2007 the SR envisaged global carbon market capital flows in the order of USD 
40 billions per annum, and the UNFCCC Secretariat envisaged flows in the order of 
USD 100 billions.65 If one allows that the issuance of a CER represent a reduction 
of emissions by one tonne CO2e and sets this against the non-Annex 1 country 
emissions reductions necessary to meet the two degrees Celsius target on the 
assumption that Annex 1 countries will meet 80 per cent of the global burden, 
then, on our own calculations, if this is the right word for something so 
speculative, these figures seem to us to be marked underestimates produced at an 
early stage of the debate, and the subsequent literature is replete with predictions 
of the growth of the carbon market magnitudes greater than the SR’s. Point 
Carbon, one of a number of international carbon market intelligence providers 
that have been set up and flourished since the UNFCCC, predicts that the value 
traded on global carbon markets will reach USD three point one trillions by 
2020.66 The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs calls the current 
financing of sustainable development in non-Annex 1 countries ‘the global 
financial mismatch of the century’,67 and believes that ‘the scale of financing 
[required for] the energy transition is several orders of magnitude greater than that 
available through current financing arrangements’.68 However this is, so long as we 
have managed to convey the astronomical size of the task set for the CDM by the 
KP,69 the point is in a sense not worth arguing, for, we repeat, a CER does not 
represent a reduction of CO2e at all. Unless there are non-Annex 1 caps, the CDM 
cannot actually make any contribution to GHG reductions, and so any attempt to 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.un.org/sg/press_green_economics.shtml. UNDESA has produced an enormous amount of 
research which is the background to The Secretary General’s views: nb UNDESA, n 31 above. 
64 eg J. Jenkins, ‘Energy Secretary Steven Chu: Honorary Breakthrough Fellow?’ Breakthrough Generation (9 
February 2009), at http://breakthroughgen.org/2009/02/13/energy-secretary-steven-chu-honorary-
breakthrough-fellow/. This article reports the views of Dr Steven Chu, the Secretary of Energy in 
President Obama’s administration. Cognisant that a second industrial revolution has already been 
distinguished by certain economic historians, other variants call for a third industrial revolution.  
65 SR, 521. 
66 Point Carbon, ‘Carbon Market Transactions in 2020: Dominated by Financials?’ Carbon Market New 
Service (21 May 2008), at http://www.pointcarbon.com/1.917962 Many of Point Carbon’s services, 
including this one, are accessible only upon subscription. 
67 UNDESA, ‘Financing Mitigation and Adaptation by Developing Countries’ (August 2009), UNDESA 
Policy Brief 22, 1. 
68 UNDESA, ‘Climate Change and the Energy Challenge’ (August 2009) UNDESA Policy Brief 24, 2. 
69 It is also fair to say that this task will have to be accomplished with extraordinary speed. But we wish to 
avoid discussion of the timescale for making emissions reductions in line with the two degrees Celsius 
target or other targets that have played a part in the debate. So shifting and vexed, even by the standards 
of climate change policy, is this issue, in which the language of ‘irreversible change’, ‘tipping points’, and 
‘catastrophe’ is widely used, that we have concluded that its proper treatment would require an article in 
itself. It is probably sensible to allow the 23 years between the conclusion of the KP in 1997 and 2020 as 
the period for assessing the KP, but every part of this claim could be contested. In a very instructive 
paper, Helm has perforce described as ‘very grim’ the prospects for success after looking the problem of 
the time set for achieving that success. D. Helm, ‘Climate Change Policy: Why Has So Little Been 
Achieved?’ in Helm and Hepburn, n 32 above, 9, 34. 
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be at all specific about the size it would have to reach to materially contribute to 
the two degrees Celsius target is simply pointless. 
 
 
 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PRC 
 
The way that the common but differentiated responsibilities were conceived has 
turned out to be fundamentally mistaken. Without passing any comment on the 
responsibility of the Annex I countries in itself, the main problem is, as was 
pointed out when this paper was first presented,70 and as became abundantly clear 
at COP15, not the Annex 1 countries but certain of the non-Annex I countries 
which the CDM invites to become hosts.71 The UNFCCC was diplomatic in 
referring to the non-Annex 1 countries as ‘developing’, for most of them were not 
and unfortunately are not substantially developing, and so are tantamount to 
irrelevant to the problem of global warming as their emissions are so small. 
However, over the past 30 years, the formerly overwhelmingly dismal science of 
development economics has taken on a far more gay aspect as it has been able to 
record the addition of the PRC,72 India, and Brazil, which formerly had seemed 
mired in poverty, to the set of newly industrialising countries, creating a ‘platinum 
age’ of growth at rates even greater then the post-war ‘golden age’ enjoyed by the 
advanced capitalist economies.73 Previously based on the east Asian dragon 
economies, the newly industrialising countries had included no countries of 
substantial size, but these are the world’s first, second, and fifth most populous 
countries, with populations of, respectively, 1.336 billions (almost 20 per cent of 
world total), 1.176 billions (almost 17 per cent) and 192 millions (almost three per 
cent).74 The growth of these countries poses, however, grave problems for GHG 
                                                     
70 M. Grubb, et al, The Kyoto Protocol (London: Earthscan, 1999), had placed early emphasis on the 
importance of the CDM. 
71 R. Garnaut, et al, ‘The Implications of Rapid Development for Emissions and Climate-change 
Mitigation’ in Helm and Hepburn, n 32 above, 81. This argument is made with a concentration on the 
PRC specifically in R. Garnaut, et al, ‘China’s Rapid Emissions Growth and Global Climate Change 
Policy’ in L. Song and W.T. Woo (eds), China’s Dilemma: Economic Growth, the Environment and Climate 
Change (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 170. 
72 See T. Carlyle, ‘Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question’ (December 1849) 40(no 240) Fraser’s 
Magazine for Town and Country 670, 672. 
73 In addition to their joint action with South Africa over climate change (n 3 above), these countries 
have, with Russia, been identified in some business literature as the ‘BRIC’ group of industrialising 
countries with large or very large populations. The development of any coordinated international position 
by the BRIC countries is at a very early stage. T. Halpin, ‘Brasil, Russia, India and China Form Bloc to 
Challenge US Dominance’ The Times (17 June 2009), at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6514737.ece. We focus on 
Brazil, India, and the PRC, not because of any coordinated position on climate change which they have 
taken or will take, but because of the objective problem they commonly pose to the reduction of GHG 
emissions.  
74 World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2010), table 1. 
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reduction. In the interests of brevity, we will confine ourselves to the PRC, but 
what we are about to say applies to India and Brazil as well.75 
Since 1978, the PRC economy has grown by over 1,000 per cent,76 to the 
point where, with a GDP of almost USD4.5 trillions (six point five per cent of 
world total), it is now the third largest economy in the world, behind the USA and 
Japan, albeit a long way behind the USA, which has a GDP of over USD14 
trillions (over 25 per cent of world total).77 However, the PRC remains 
overwhelmingly a poor country, with a per capita income of only 12 per cent of that 
of the US, and it is committed to continuing with this rate of growth in order to 
generalise the wealth now mainly enjoyed in coastal regions throughout its 
immense hinterland, in which around one half of a billion people still live on 
≤USD two per day.78 Although such forecasting is, of course, intrinsically 
extremely difficult, the PRC has been authoritatively forecast to overtake the USA 
as the world’s largest economy by 2030 at the latest.79 As a necessary condition of 
this growth, the PRC’s power generation capacity, which is based on utilisation of 
its immense reserves of coal, is predicted to expand enormously. In 2006, the PRC 
had 350 gigawatts of coal-fired power generation capacity. It plans to install an 
additional (net of retirements) 600 gigawatts (with ancillary transmission and 
distribution systems) by 2030.80 To put this into context, in 2008, the entire coal-
fired power generation capacity of the US was 313 gigawatts (31 per cent of total 
US power generation capacity).81 This is to say, by 2030 China plans to install 
additional coal-fired power generation capacity equal to almost 200 per cent of 
existing US capacity.  
The crucial part the CDM must play in the development of global carbon 
trading follows from these facts, which show that the economic success of the 
PRC poses the main challenge to global climate change mitigation. The PRC 
                                                     
75 The residuum of what were the ‘developing countries’ under the UNFCCC are now recognised as a 
distinct category of ‘least developed countries’ (using terminology generally employed by the UN) by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, and these countries do seem to be forming a distinct negotiating bloc, distinct from 
the BRIC countries with which they are normally united in the Group of 77 plus China, certainly after 
COP15 showed the divergence of interest between the least developing countries and the actually 
developing countries with large populations. J. Kyalimpa, ‘Climate Change: Least Developed countries 
Spell Out Demands’ InterPress Service News Agency (11 December 2009), at 
http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=49649. The situation of these countries is the principal 
concern in the debate about ‘climate justice’. A.D. Sagar, ‘Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring 
an Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions’ (2000) 45 Climatic Change 511. Certain UNFCCC 
policies are directed at the least developed countries, but they need not be discussed here. 
76 A. Heston, et al, Penn World Table Version 6.3 (Centre for International Comparisons of Production, 
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009), at 
 http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php.  
77 World Bank, n 74 above, table 4. Since this was drafted, it would seem that the PRC may have 
overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy and certainly is on course to do so in the near 
future. 
78 ibid, table 2. 
79 A. Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long-Run (Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 
2nd ed, 2007), fig 4.1. 
80 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2009 (US Department of Energy/EIA-
0484(2009), fig 46 and associated text, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2009).pdf. 
81 Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 2008 (US Department of Energy/EIA-
0348(2008)), table ES1, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. 
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recently replaced the USA as the world’s largest emitter of anthropogenic GHGs, 
now being responsible for over 20 per cent of global emissions.82 It has done this 
whilst its per capita emissions, which in 1990 were on a par with those of, say, sub-
Saharan countries, are still less than a quarter of those of the US, but will, of 
course, further increase as a corollary of economic growth.83 The PRC currently is 
responsible for more than half of the global growth in emissions, and this trend vis 
a vis Annex 1 countries must markedly strengthen on current trends.84 The PRC 
presents then, for practical purposes, an unbounded extensive margin for 
anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
In this situation, unless the PRC substantially contributes to emissions 
reduction, it does not matter what the rest of the world does, or, specifically, what 
the Annex I countries do, even if the US is included; much less what the UK, 
responsible for less than two per cent of global emissions, itself does. The global 
nature of the externality on which the KP strategy turns will then work against 
Annex I reductions, making them pointless, unless the PRC makes concomitant 
reductions. What has so far happened under the KP could not more forcefully 
bear this out. At the end of the FCP, the increase in PRC emissions will be in the 
order of 1,000 per cent of the total of the reductions the Annex I countries were 
to make under the KP.85 This particular inconvenient truth did not sufficiently 
forcefully impress itself on UNFCCC negotiations until recently, but a growing 
perception that something radical had to be done about PRC emissions was the 
major issue that derailed COP15, leading to the PRC now being subjected to 
something like the criticism previously directed at the USA.86 
In our opinion, to take this attitude towards the PRC fails to give proper 
weight to two considerations.87 First, it is highly arguable that the Communist 
Party has no practical political possibility of substantially revising down its growth 
targets, for political stability in the PRC now depends on meeting those targets.88 
It is also highly arguable that, even were it to have room to manoeuvre, the PRC 
would choose not to abandon those targets because it genuinely believes that the 
                                                     
82 International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics (Paris: IEA, 2009), 49-57, at 
http://iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf. 
83 World Bank, n 74 above, table A1. 
84 J.S. Gregg, et al, ‘China: Emissions Pattern of World Leader in CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel 
Consumption and Cement Production’ (2008) 35(8) Geophysical Research Letters LO8806. The latest 
evidence seems, incredibly, to show a strengthening of these trends. M. Shealy and J.P. Doran, ‘Growing 
Chinese Coal Use: Dramatic Resource and Environmental Implications’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 2116. 
85 M. Auffhammer and R.T. Carson, ‘Forecasting the Path of China’s CO2 Emissions Using Province 
Level Information’ (2008) 55 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 229. 
86 S. Coates and J. Macartney, ‘China to Blame for Failure of Copenhagen Climate Deal, Says Ed 
Miliband’ The Times (21 December 2009), at  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6964106.ece. This article reports the views 
of the then Secretary for the Environment and Climate Change. See also n 54 above. 
87 Or three, when it is acknowledged that the PRC’s stance is perfectly legitimate in terms of what was 
agreed in the UNFCCC and all subsequent negotiations including the CA.  
88 D.L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006). 
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welfare cost of perpetuating the still very low living standards of the bulk of its 
population outweighs the welfare gains from anthropogenic GHG reduction. Its 
2007 National Climate Change Programme, prepared at the behest of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat, argues this position,89 which was firmly stated in its 
notification to the CA. However this is, the PRC’s stance at COP15, predicted in 
earlier versions of this paper, is no surprise for we believe that the combined 
weight of these two considerations will prevent the PRC ever committing to 
anthropogenic GHG emissions reductions that will allow the world to stay within 
the two degrees Celsius limit. More or less the same can be said for India and 
Brazil. 
 
 
 
THE OPERATION OF THE CDM IN THE PRC 
 
At the time of the agreement of the KP, the climate change threat was regarded as 
a major policy opportunity. The PRC was not going to be required to forego 
development but the CDM was to facilitate the transfer of and innovation in 
emissions reduction technology so that, in particular, the expansion of PRC power 
generating capacity would not undermine global emissions targets. In the absence 
of the USA, the EUETS has been by far the major Annex I institution for CDM 
trade generally, and the European Commission has established an EU-China 
CDM Facilitation Project which ‘aims to strengthen the [CDM] as a central pillar 
within China’s path to sustainable development’.90 European parties wishing to 
offset their emissions would be able, by the purchase of CERs, effectively to pay 
PRC power generators to invest heavily in emissions reduction, from which the 
PRC would both directly benefit in terms of reduced emissions and indirectly 
benefit by building upon the technology transfer to reduce the carbon intensity of 
growth more generally. As the EU-China CDM Facilitation Project puts it: 
 
China and the EU[’s] partnership on climate change [...] contains two 
concrete co-operation goals to be achieved by 2020. The first is to 
demonstrate and develop, in China and the EU, advanced near ‘zero 
emissions’ coal technology. The second goal is to significantly reduce the cost 
of key technologies and to promote their deployment and dissemination. 
Furthermore, the Partnership also aims to reinforce EU-China cooperation 
through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) by 
strengthening the implementation of CDM, facilitating the exchange of 
information on CDM projects and encouraging both European and Chinese 
companies to engage in CDM project co-operation. 
                                                     
89 National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC, China’s National Programme for Climate 
Change (June 2007), at http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/213624.htm. For a range of 
perspectives on this crucial issue see Song and Woo, n 71 above. 
90 EU-China CDM Facilitation Project website, at http://www.euchina-cdm.org/#. 
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Though the PRC dominates CDM activity, hosting almost 50 per cent of CERs 
issued,91 the attempt to realise these goals through the operation of the CDM has 
been so marked a failure as to amount to a farcical waste of resources. The initial 
growth of CDM activity very substantially turned on the opportunistic 
manipulation of the architecture of the KP. Though discussion of global warming 
commonly refers only to the effect of CO2, CERs are measured,92 not in CO2, but 
in CO2e because Annex B to the KP identified a ‘basket’ of six anthropogenic 
GHGs: in addition to CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, the 
hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), and the perfluorocarbons. The last two are groups of 
gasses which are rare in nature and largely are industrial products.93 HFCs are 
widely used in the electronics industry and as flame retardants, propellants, and 
refrigerants, their use having significantly increased since the Montreal Protocol, 
for they are substitutes for ozone depleting gases identified under that Protocol.94 
Up to 2007, the great majority of the CERs,95 of a value estimated to reach almost 
USD five billions by the end of the FCP,96 were issued, not in relationship to 
power generation, or directly in relationship to CO2 at all, but in relationship to 
HFC23, a by-product of the production of HFC22, a valuable refrigerant gas.97 
This prima facie curious concentration of CDM activity, not on the central 
activity of power generation, but on a miniscule part of the PRC economy, is 
readily explicable by reference to the way the CDM works. The IPCC views CO2 
as the most significant anthropogenic GHG because of the vast volumes of it that 
are emitted, but it is by no means the most potent GHG. During the time when 
the CDM was being established, the IPCC gave HFC23 a Global Warming 
Potential (GWP) rating of 11,700, which is to say HFC23 is stated to be 11,700 
times more potent a global warming gas than CO2.98 This means that, for every 
tonne of HFC23 that is not emitted in a non-Annex I country, CERs allowing 
11,700 tonnes of emission of CO2 in an Annex I country will be issued. As it 
                                                     
91 CDM website, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Issuance/CERsIssuedByHostPartyPieChart.html 
India hosts 20 per cent. India’s and the PRC’s share of the number of projects is similar, at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/AmountOfReductRegisteredProjPieChart.html. 
92 And other ‘Kyoto units’ relating to other parts of the KP.  
93 The standard chemical formula for the HFCs is CEF3, and their standard name in chemistry is 
trifluoromethane. HFC23 is a trade name.  
94 IPCC, Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
95 P. Castro and A. Michaelowa, Empirical Analysis of Performance of CDM Projects (London: Climate 
Strategies, 2008), fig 1, at http://www.climatestrategies.org/our-reports/category/39/138.html. 
96 This is the figure given in M. Wara, ‘Is the Global Carbon Market Working’ (2007) 445(7128) Nature 
594. It is, of course, highly speculative as it is dependent on the market price of CERs generally, and one 
can find much larger estimates of it in the literature. 
97 ibid. See further M. Wara, ‘Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and 
Potential’ (2007-2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 1759. 
98 There is, of course, no empirical evidence of the long-term GWP of these gasses, and the construction 
of GWP data is a complex and speculative matter which is brilliantly discussed in D. Mackenzie, ‘Making 
Things the Same: Gasses, Emissions Rights and the Politics of Carbon Markets’ (2009) 34 Accounting, 
Organisations and Society 440. The IPCC has since revalued the GWP of HFC23 to 14,800. 
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happens, the scrubbing of HFC23 from refrigerant gas production plants is 
technologically simple and cheap, and is now perfectly routine in refrigerant gas 
production in Annex 1 countries. The consequence both of this fact and the 
enormous GWP rating of HFC23 has been a huge growth in refrigerant gas 
production in the PRC, unarguably in pursuit of the CERs, which are a far greater 
source of profit than actual refrigerant gas production. This outrageous situation 
was brought to wide attention by Michael Wara and his colleagues in the Stanford 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, on whose work we have drawn 
heavily. Wara tells us that ‘refrigerant manufacturers were transformed overnight 
by the CDM into ventures that generated large volumes of CERs, with a sideline 
in the manufacture of industrial gasses’.99 
Attempts have been made, and persist,100 to explain the concentration on 
HFC23 mitigation as an instance of project developers first picking the ‘low 
hanging fruit’ offered by the cheapness of HFC23 mitigation. But it is of the nature 
of the attractiveness of low hanging fruit that it encourages attempts to grow more 
of it, and this is exactly what happened in this episode. Responses to this particular 
problem are, of course, possible, and the CDMEB now takes a very strict line 
towards HFC23 proposals, with such CER issuance for this as continues largely 
being a matter of things working through the pipeline. More generally, the IPCC’s 
inclusion of the HFCs in the Annex B list of GHGs, especially with the GWP 
rating given to HFC23, now seems like a mistake,101 and the target set for almost 
complete elimination of HFC22 production in developing countries under the 
Montreal Protocol has been brought forward to 2030, with this elimination now 
being financed by, in effect, direct, targeted subsidy from Annex I parties. 
But for future projects not to give rise to similar problems, future regulation 
must prevent the perverse incentive that gave rise to the HFC23 episode occurring 
again, and attempts to do this have failed, with the result that the problem has 
been reproduced. PRC HFC23 mitigation has been replaced by PRC hydro-electric 
power generation as the preponderant CDM activity. On its face this seems a 
move in the right direction, and the magnitude and technological difficulty of 
many of these projects, which could hardly be more different to the easy process 
of HFC23 scrubbing, cannot present a similar invitation to develop projects just for 
                                                     
99 M.W. Wara and D.G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets (Working Paper 74, 
Programme on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University, April 2008). 
100 UNEP, ‘Action on HFC Gases “Low Hanging Fruit” Opportunity to Combat Climate Change Says 
UN Environment Chief’ (Press Release, 22 June 2009), at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=589&ArticleID=6227&l=en. 
This press release reports the response of Mr Achim Steiner, UN Under-Secretary General and UNEP 
Executive Director, to a scientific paper confirming the enormous projected growth in developing 
country emissions of HFCs and the cheapness of eliminating HFC emissions. G.J.M. Velder, ‘The Large 
Contribution of Projected HFC Emissions to Future Climate Forcing’ (7 July 2009) 106(27) Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Science of the USA 10949. The scientific paper makes no reference whatsoever to the 
regulatory problems, of which its authors no doubt are wholly ignorant, and, unfortunately typically, 
neither does Mr Steiner.  
101 S. Barrett, ‘Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement’ in Helm and Hepburn, n 32 above.  
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the CERs they will generate. But, as Wara and his colleagues have shown,102 what 
has happened is no less problematic. 
Hydro-electric power installation could represent an emissions reduction only 
if it replaced projected growth in, say, coal-fired generation. But such is the 
immensity of the PRC’s growth plans that to maintain that this is happening is 
completely implausible, and it is most disturbing that this has not prevented the 
issuance of CERs for the PRC’s extremely ambitious hydro-electric power 
generation plans. Despite being by far the world’s largest coal producer (more 
than double the USA), the PRC is now a major net coal importer, with imports 
growing at the astronomical rates (170 per cent in 2009) one associates with PRC 
growth statistics. It is impossible that, under these circumstances, the PRC would 
not seek to diversify power generation away from coal, and develop hydro-electric 
and coal-fired generation simultaneously. Though it is of the nature of the 
situation to which we are trying to direct attention that no data in which one can 
place real confidence will ever emerge, it is almost certain that none whatsoever of 
the CERs issued for PRC hydro-electric power generation represent actual 
emissions reductions, and entirely possible that CDM has actually expanded PRC 
GHG emissions through power generation overall.  
In light of these two major failures, the claimed success of the CDM in terms 
of the growth of CER issuance up to the end of the FCP is illusory in terms of its 
intended environmental impact. There has been a tremendous growth in activity, 
but that activity cannot contribute to global emissions reduction, and very well 
may not have substantially contributed to emissions reductions even within non-
Annex 1 countries. It is likely that it has increased them, and we strongly suspect 
that it has. The available evidence would appear to lead to conclusions of 
essentially the same nature in respect of projects in other hosts, including India,103 
and Brasil.104 It is beyond dispute that the CDM has been subject to a very serious 
regulatory failure of its ‘environmental integrity’, and to the analysis of this we 
now turn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
102 Activist criticism of hydro-electric projects also has been very telling: eg B. Haya, Failed Mechanism: 
How the CDM is Subsidising Hydro Developers and Harming the Kyoto Protocol (International Rivers Report, 
November 2007), at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/Failed_Mechanism_3.pdf. 
103 P. Castro and G. Bedecke, Empirical Analysis of Performance of CDM Projects: Case Study India (Climate 
Strategies Discussion Paper CDM-7, February 2008), at http://www.climatestrategies.org/our-
reports/category/39/168.html.  
104 L. Fribirg and P. Castro, Empirical Analysis of Performance of CDM Projects: Case Study Brasil (Climate 
Strategies Discussion Paper CDM-8, February 2008), at http://www.climatestrategies.org/our-
reports/category/39/166.html. 
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SOME MOST UNCOMFORTABLE LESSONS 
 
Whilst this is now being written with the advantage of hindsight, it was pointed 
out at the time of the establishment of the CDM,105 that something of the nature 
of the HFC23 episode would take place, though the extraordinary size of the 
problem posed by a single, relatively unimportant gas was not foreseen,106 certainly 
not by those who included HFC23 in Annex B. 
The fundamental problem is that, though any development project can and 
will lead to action which runs counter to the project’s aims, the CDM gives an 
extremely wide invitation to such action, and there is a serious limit about what 
can be done about this. The measuring of emissions, and therefore of reductions, 
is itself a highly vexed process,107 but at least ‘emissions reduction verification’ 
under the CDM can have reference to a claimed physical output. In contrast, 
‘project validation’ by the CDMEB is a purely theoretical process entirely 
dependent on the establishment of a baseline which is a forecast of a state of 
affairs which it is intended will never come about.108 The methodology of all cost-
benefit analysis is open to criticism of the robustness of the identification of 
benefits, but the counterfactual baseline of carbon projects is speculative in a way 
which must exaggerate this difficulty, and therefore, by its nature, the CDM 
approvals process is fundamentally fragile, and readily open to opportunistic 
manipulation.109 As such, this process is extremely dependent on the integrity of 
the participants which, from the perspective of regulatory design, is a matter of 
correctly aligning incentives. Unfortunately, the conclusion we draw from our 
analysis is that the CDM is, in the jargon of institutional economics, an incentive 
incompatible design,110 creating immense moral hazard.111 As these points have 
been made in outline by numerous previous commentators,112 we can be brief. 
There is an obvious incentive for those in non-Annex I countries who will 
receive monetizable CERs to make ‘false’ or ‘phantom reductions’, and an equally 
obvious incentive for their national authorities to approve these ‘hot air’ 
reductions to almost costlessly increase foreign investment and facilitate growth in 
                                                     
105 D. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 62. 
106 A major World Bank study of the operation of the CDM in the PRC published in 2004 did not include 
HFC23 in any of its case studies: World Bank, Clean Development Mechanism in China (Washington DC: 
World Bank, 2nd ed, September 2004). 
107 E. Nisbet, et al, ‘Issues in Establishing in situ Greenhouse Gas Monitoring Networks in Europe and in 
Regions of Interest to Europe’ in H. Dolman, et al (eds), Ecological Studies, Vol 203: The Continental-Scale 
Greenhouse Gas Balance of Europe (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 91. 
108 C. Zhang, et al, ‘Carbon Intensity of Electricity Generation and CDM Baseline: Case Studies of Three 
Chinese Provinces’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 451. 
109 A. Michaelowa and P. Purohit, Additionality Determination of Indian CDM Projects: Can Indian CDM Project 
Developers Outwit the CDM Executive Board? (Climate Strategies Discussion Paper CDM-1, 1 February 2007), 
at http://www.climatestrategies.org/our-reports/category/39/162.html. 
110 L. Hurwicz, `On Informationally Decentralised Systems' in C.B. McGuire and R. Radner (eds), Decision 
and Organisation (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1972), 320. 
111 M.V. Pauly, ‘The Economics of Moral Hazard’ (1968) 58 American Economic Review 531. 
112 eg E. Woerdman, The Institutional Economics of Market-based Climate Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004). 
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their economies.113 It is to counter this moral hazard that CDMEB methodology, 
approval and monitoring seek to ensure ‘additionality’ in the sense that a carbon 
project must secure reductions in addition to any reductions which would, without 
CDM funding, have taken place. Additionality is, indeed, the whole point of the 
CDM. But, other than that provided by compliance with the formal requirements 
of the CDM project validation process, we can see no incentive which the CDM 
provides to non-Annex I parties to respect additionality. The incentive it provides 
is aligned in quite the opposite direction, and we can see no effective 
countervailing tendency. The PRC evidence we have reviewed shows this to be no 
merely theoretical concern. It is the explanation of most CDM activity. It must be 
said that the non-Annex I parties, including the PRC, are countries in which a lack 
of integrity of governance, including outright corruption, have been identified as 
major obstacles to obtaining welfare-enhancing returns to investment in other 
development projects.114 In our opinion, carbon projects will tend to be subject to 
immense moral hazard as they are of a nature which gives a wide invitation to this 
and are to take place in environments where such invitations are widely known to 
be taken.115 
In light of what has happened so far, COP15 decided to continue with a 
review of ‘capacity building’116 in host countries,117 begun in 2004.118 Capacity 
                                                     
113 Wara, n 97 above, tells us that CER income from HFC23 reduction is taxed by the PRC government at 
65 per cent. CDM activity generally in the PRC has, unsurprisingly, been marked by a very high degree of 
government involvement: K. Tangen and G. Heggelund, ‘Will the Clean Development Mechanism be 
Effectively Implemented in China?’ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 303. On the place of national authorities in the 
CDM architecture, see text accompanying n 131 below. Any moral sanction inhibiting the making of 
non-additional proposals will be weakened to the extent that phantom reductions may be seen as a wealth 
transfer from developed to developing countries which it is only right should take place anyway, which is 
the atmosphere of everything that has happened under the UNFCCC.  
114 Brazil, India, and the PRC are respectively 75, 84, and 79 on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2009. 180 countries are ranked with the least corrupt at 1, at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table. 
115 W.D. Nordhaus, ‘Economic Analyses of the Kyoto Protocol: Is There Life After Kyoto?’ in E. Zedillo 
(ed), Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto (New Haven: Center for the Study of Globalisation, Yale 
University, 2008), 91, 98. In the development literature, the situation in which what should be the 
beneficent presence of natural resources so leads to the exploitation of those resources in ways which 
actually diminish welfare has been described as the ‘resource curse’. R. Torvik, ‘Natural Resources, Rent 
Seeking and Welfare’ (2002) 67 Journal of Development Economics 455. The commodification of potential 
GHG emissions in countries which are actually developing represents, in this sense, the creation of an 
enormous ‘natural resource’.  
116 COP15, Draft Decision: Capacity Building Under the Convention; and CMP5, Draft Decision: Capacity Building 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php. 
117 Of course, one should not ignore compliance issues in the Annex 1 countries. A striking US example 
is the perverse incentive offered by a tax credit intended to promote the use of biofuel which has led to 
the addition of fossil fuel to a major method of major wood pulp production formerly more or less 
entirely based on biofuel. C. Hayes, ‘Pulp Nonfiction’ The Nation (20 April 2009), at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090420/hayes; and B. Ivry and C. Donville, ‘Black Liquor Tax 
Boondoggle May Net Billions for Papermakers’ Bloomberg.com (17 April 2009), at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=abDjfGgdumh4. This would be hilarious 
were it not for the cost, running into USD billions, and the consequent disruption of the wood pulp 
industry, which has led to an international trade dispute. There also has been a remarkable growth in 
HFC23 activity under the EUETS which we are currently investigating: EEA, Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trends and Projections in Europe 2009 (Copenhagen: EEA, 2009), sec 2.3. 
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building was mentioned in UNFCCC, art 9, and KP, art 10(e), but was at all 
seriously addressed only in the Marrakesh Accords agreed in 2001 at COP7,119 
which the IPCC claims gave ‘detailed rules for the implementation of the 
Protocol’.120 This claim is exaggerated in all respects,121 and, though a Compliance 
Committee was (tellingly belatedly, the last of the KP institutions) created in 
March 2006,122 its ‘enforcement branch’ has no jurisdiction over non-Annex 1 
countries, which have, of course, no concrete KP reductions obligations, and one 
has to say that what was said then and is being said now of capacity building is so 
vague and general that it is better regarded as the recognition of necessary work 
rather than to any plausible statement of how the work might be carried out.  
Very worryingly, the CDM also gives the Annex 1 purchasers of CERs an 
incentive towards trading in phantom reductions, so that they will not operate as a 
countervailing force to the non-Annex 1 sellers. If one assumes (against the 
evidence) that the governments of the Annex I parties impose a cap which actually 
is a biting constraint on emissions, then the purchase of CERs allows the effective 
relaxation of that cap by offsetting CERs against domestic reduction targets. This 
the way the CDM is meant to work. So far, despite its failure to reduce its 
domestic emissions in line with its FCP targets that we have noted, the EU and 
the UK has been able publicly to claim to be somewhere near their FCP targets,123 
because inter alia offsets have distorted reported emissions reductions in a way that 
is not transparent.124 In our opinion, were the practices common in EU and UK 
official reporting on this issue to take place in a commercial context such as the 
issuance of a company prospectus, they would amount to fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
In recognition of this, just as additionality is meant to be central to the 
operation of the CDM in non-Annex I parties, so ‘supplementarity’ is meant to be 
                                                                                                                                       
118 COP10, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth Session, Held at Buenos Aires from 6 to 18 December 
2004 (FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1, Decision 2/CP/10), at  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf. 
119 COP7, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 
November 2001 (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1-4, Decision 2/CP7), at  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf. 
120 UNFCC website, at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
121 eg P.G. Harris, ‘Europe and the Politics and Foreign Policy of Global Climate Change’ in P.G. Harris 
(ed), Europe and Global Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 3, 13, describes the Marrakesh 
Accords as ‘a complicated mix of measures for implementing the [KP], largely designed to gain 
ratification from enough states to allow the [KP] to enter into force’. 
122 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Groundbreaking Kyoto Protocol Compliance System Launched’ (Press 
Release, 3 March 2006), at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/20060303_co
mpliance_committee_1st_meeting.pdf. A schematic representation of ‘the compliance system’ is available 
at http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_mechanisms/compliance/application/pdf/comp_schematic.pdf. 
123 EEA, n 117 above, fig 2.4. In addition to including offsets, this graph excludes aircraft, shipping, and 
certain other emissions. 
124 ibid, 12: ‘In 2009 the progress of EU-15 Member States towards their targets was assessed, for the first 
time, by focusing on projections of their non-ETS emissions.’ The general problem is commendably (but 
in our opinion most inadequately) addressed in Environmental Audit Committee, Eighth Report: Emissions 
Trading: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2006–07 on the EU ETS (2006-2007) 
(HC 1072). 
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central to its operation in Annex I parties. The use of CERs is meant to be limited 
so that offsetting is essentially supplementary to domestic reductions, which still 
have to be made. But it is obvious that supplementarity is quite in contradiction to 
the entire way the CDM is to work. Offsetting is the source of CDM finance. 
Eliminating it would eliminate that finance. Despite its adoption by, for example, 
the UK,125 supplementarity can hardly be said to be a policy at all. It is rather a 
statement of a pious wish that runs counter to the basic aim of the CDM and of 
those trading in CERs in both Annex I and non-Annex I countries. 
In sum, project developers in host countries and purchasers in Annex 1 
countries are both aligned against a third party, the taxpayer, and consumer in 
Annex 1 countries, from whom CDM finance ultimately is derived, creating a 
classic ‘rent-seeking’ system.126 It is of much less importance than this 
fundamentally foolish alignment of incentives, but carbon project design under the 
CDM allows great opportunities for collusion between the operator of the 
installation that will generate the CERs and the purchaser of those CERs. 
Although ‘unilateral CDM’, in which a potential emitter in a non-Annex I country 
unilaterally registers a project, the CERs of which it will eventually offer for sale, is 
possible,127 it runs against the grain of the CDM and so far it is rare. As was 
envisaged in the technology transfer element of the CDM, the standard project is 
the result of the purchaser of the CERs entering into cooperation with their 
generator, the former bringing its finance and technological capacity to bear from 
the outset, and generating the project design as a result. In this relationship, 
respect for additionality and supplementarity simply runs counter to the reason the 
relationship exists. 
All this, of course, places an immense burden on the CDM approvals process, 
and therefore on the CDMEB. Though it makes final approvals, that process was 
bound to become extremely burdensome if the CDM was any sort of a success, 
and an implausibly immense bureaucracy would be needed if the CDMEB was 
itself to carry out approvals. The approvals process has been delegated to 
subsidiary regulatory bodies which the CDMEB accredits called ‘Designated 
Operational Entities’ (DOE). These currently are 25 private sector companies,128 
which have taken up the role of DOEs with the aim of promoting carbon trading, 
their profitability being directly proportional to its success. These companies 
describe a range from long-established, reputable validation organisations to newly 
incorporated companies,129 but it is obviously extremely hazardous to place bodies 
with such obvious conflicts of interest in these vital monitoring roles. We feel 
                                                     
125 Climate Change Act 2008, sec 11. 
126 A.O. Kreuger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society’ (1974) 64 American Economic Review 
291. 
127 CDMEB, Eighteenth Meeting Report (CDM-EB-18, 25 February 2005), para 57, at  
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/018/eb18rep.pdf  
128 CDM website, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html. 
129 But see n 130 below. 
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ourselves to be falling into repetition when we say that it comes as no surprise 
that, in the more suspicious climate in which it now feels itself to operate after 
criticisms such as Wara’s received public attention, the CDMEB has had 
temporarily to suspend two of the ‘big three’ DOEs responsible for the great 
majority of CERs issued so far.130 
The ‘Designated National Authorities’ (DNAs) which the parties to the KP 
must establish to participate in the CDM were initially intended to play a 
background role, giving formal initial authorisation to and registering project 
activities essentially for the purposes of data gathering and policy formulation, and 
providing public support for those activities.131 In the more suspicious climate we 
have mentioned, the UNFCCC Secretariat and the CDMEB envisage a much 
more active role for DNAs in the ‘scaling up’ of the CDM now generally thought 
to be urgent. In particular, ‘sectoral trading’, in which DNAs actively plan for 
reductions below caps in sectors they identify, has been advocated.132 Although 
sectoral trading is to be motivated by sale of unused allowances on the 
international emissions market, it is in effect a move back towards command and 
control which effectively acknowledges the failure of market-mimicking. It 
therefore is implausible for the reasons which led UNFCCC to adopt the KP 
flexibility mechanisms in the first place.133  
The CDMEB, set up under art 12 of the Marrakesh Accords, is a 10-member 
supervisory panel which may appoint such committees, working groups, etc as it 
sees fit to help it in its supervisory role, but which has the principal function of 
approving the methodologies of project design and appointing and monitoring 
DOEs. In a very rare show of agreement in this vexed area, the CDMEB itself is 
universally acknowledged to have been extremely under-resourced when 
                                                     
130 ‘UN Suspends One of the “Big Three” CDM Auditors’ European Daily Carbon Markets (14 September 
2009). European Daily Carbon Markets is the market newsletter of ICIS Heren, a reputable energy market 
intelligence service. Very considerable effort researching the UNFCCC databases has so far failed to shed 
light on the detail of these suspensions, other than that they were not of recently formed companies but 
of the number we have described as long-established and reputable.  
131 A list of DNAs is available at the CDM website, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/index.html. The 
entry for the UK is out of date. DECC is the UK DNA, at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/change_energy/tackling_clima/intl_strat/mech
anisms/clean_developm/clean_developm.aspx. DECC has set up a non-profit company, the Carbon 
Trust, as a ‘delivery partner’ with ‘the mission to accelerate the move to a low carbon economy’, at 
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/about-carbon-trust/pages/default.aspx. 
132 M. Lazarowicz, Global Carbon Trading (London: The Stationery Office, 2009), sec 6.3. This report, 
commissioned by the former Prime Minister, was the leading document on the former government’s 
longer-term thinking on climate change policy. 
133 The case for a carbon tax is sound insofar as it rests on an exposure of the shortcomings of KP 
emissions trading, but it is telling that it is this, rather than any argument that a tax is plausible, that plays 
the greater part in the most influential statements of that case. The point is clear in W.D. Nordhaus, A 
Question of Balance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), ch 8, but even more clear in R.N. Cooper, 
‘Towards a Real Global Warming Treaty’ (1998) 77(2) Foreign Affairs 66; ‘Alternatives to Kyoto: The Case 
for a Carbon Tax’ in J. Aldy and R.L. Stavins (eds), Architectures for Agreement (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), ch 3.1. We want, without argument, to say that we agree with the claim that the 
KP had no chance of being concluded had it sought to implement a biting global carbon tax regime; 
indeed, agreeing trading mechanisms which would have initially involved biting emissions reductions 
without extensive flexibility would have been impossible for the same reasons. M. Grubb, et al, The Kyoto 
Protocol (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), sec 3.7.  
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established, and this has rightly been regarded as contributing to governance 
failures which it is now recognised must be addressed.134 But, on the other hand, 
the CDMEB has been continually beset by extensive, justified complaints about 
the unarguably unacceptable length of the project pipeline caused by the time 
taken to secure approval, and though the resourcing of the CDMEB is being 
addressed, these complaints must persist, and surely grow enormously larger 
whatever the resource allocated if the CDM is to substantially contribute to 
emissions reductions in line with the two degrees Celsius target, even if the bulk of 
the work can be delegated to DOEs. The size of the CDM reductions which must 
be secured pose, to our mind, an impossibly demanding organisational task for the 
CDMEB.  
 
 
 
THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE KP 
 
The conclusion we draw from this description and analysis of the structure and 
operation of the CDM is that it never has had, nor does it have now, any prospect 
whatsoever of working in the sense of securing GHG emissions reductions in line 
with the targets which have been set to avoid DAI, including the two degrees 
Celsius target. And, in our view, this is the inevitable result of the structure of the 
KP. We hope we have shown that the KP embodies a mistaken policy. But it is 
not enough to say that it is mistaken. We must recognise that it is not rational.135 It 
is necessary for an emissions reduction policy of the ‘top down’ nature of the KP 
to disaggregate any global emissions reduction target into individual targets for 
responsible authorities, in essence countries which, combined, are to meet the 
overall target. Because of the technologically global nature of the problem, these 
targets are mutually dependent,136 and, in the continuing absence of targets for 
non-Annex I countries, and with it not being possible to have confidence in the 
                                                     
134 COP15, Draft Decision: Further Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism, paras 6-43, at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cmp5_cdm_auv.pdf.  
135 R.S.J. Tol, ‘Kyoto, Efficieny and Cost-Effectiveness’ (1999) 20 Energy Journal Special Issue 131, 153. 
136 Nordhaus has done the most to examine this in the context of the varying burdens which would have 
to be born given differing levels of participation. Nordhaus, n 133 above; ‘The Impact of Treaty 
Nonparticipation on the Costs of Slowing Global Warming’ (2009) 30 Energy Journal Special Issue 2, 39. Of 
course, one can have no more reason to believe the participation data Nordhaus needs for his modelling 
would ever be available whether policy is based on the KP or on his carbon tax regime, for this regime 
would be beset by implementation problems as much as the KP, a point about which Nordhaus is, in 
fact, equivocal. R.P. Murphy, ‘Rolling the DICE: William Nordhaus’s Dubious Case for a Carbon Tax’ 
(2009) 14 The Independent Review 197 (DICE is the Dynamic Intergrated Model of Climate and Economy, 
one of the models used in the macro-economics of climate change). In particular, an elementary study of 
current international taxation shows that no country will ever be in or out of the tax regime in the way 
Nordhaus’ modelling requires. 
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implementation of the CDM (and therefore any global carbon market),137 there is 
no rational way in which any individual targets can be set. 
In these circumstances, the typical policy has been to set caps or other targets 
which are as ambitious as it is politically possible to set in the two beliefs that any 
progress towards emissions reduction as may result will be of value, and that, the 
greater the pressure created by the cap, the more the market will be stimulated into 
action. But action in pursuit of the impossible is irrational, and great costs are 
being imposed on those Annex 1 economies which are implementing policies 
related to carbon trading in return for no progress on any KP target. The UK’s 
policy under the Climate Change 2008 is a most pronounced example of this, for it 
sets sectoral targets which, if taken literally to mean concrete reductions in 
domestic emissions, require rates of ‘decarbonisation’ of the national economy 
which it has plausibly been argued are impossibly costly to achieve.138 
Nevertheless, that what is being pursued is impossible does not mean that 
immense costs may not be run up in the course of the doomed effort.139 
The incurring of great costs under the 2008 Act in the conditions established 
by the KP cannot be subject to the cost-benefit calculations which have been the 
basis of the assessment of national welfare economic intervention. As the costs of 
climate change mitigation for each country cannot be known because of the 
inability to control emissions from the non-Annex 1 countries, there can be no 
welfare gain in terms of KP goals from observing Annex 1 domestic caps, and the 
costs of such observance theoretically can grow to infinity in a doomed attempt to 
counter their fruitlessness.140 The practical political and economic limits to the 
                                                     
137 In relationship to EU policy, see J. Scott, ‘The Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change’ in P. Craig 
and G. de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). We are 
grateful to Professor Scott for showing us this work in draft. 
138 R.A. Pielke, Jr, ‘The British Climate Change Act: A Critical Evaluation and Proposed Alternative 
Approach’ (2009) 4 Environmental Research Letters 1. Though we have benefitted from his exposition of this 
Act, which highlights its many difficulties, we find Professor Stallworthy to be too sanguine about its 
prospects of success: M. Stallworthy, ‘Legislating Against Climate Change: A UK Perspective on a 
Sisyphean Challenge’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 412. 
139 For the reasons we are setting out, the KP commits any Annex-1 country that takes its emissions 
reduction responsibility seriously to an obligation to do so regardless of a cost which effectively is 
unbounded, in essence ‘an open-ended surrender of a potentially important part of their sovereignty’. 
W.J. McKibbon and P.J. Wilcoxen, Climate Change Policy After Kyoto (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2002), 53. This obviously is a good reason for any Annex 1 Government which considers its 
national interest not to undertake that responsibility, or to do so only in a way which undermines the 
possibility of meeting the targets, and this is more or less what has happened with the CA.  
140 Leaving aside the more direct costs, to the extent that a country does manage to affect the pricing of 
its products so that it does include a shadow cost for carbon, this will lower its international 
competitiveness against countries which do not do this. The SR, ch 11l takes a sanguine view of this 
‘competiveness threat’, though this seems to us to be a major issue. The evaluation of the problem in the 
Australian Garnaut Review seems to us to be much more realistic. R. Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change 
Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch 14. At a further stage of the analysis, it can be 
predicted that, to the extent that the competitiveness threat leads to a relocation of production from an 
Annex I country to a non-Annex I country, but the relocated output is then exported to the Annex I 
country, then the consequent reduction in the Annex I country’s emissions is completely illusory. The 
emissions now take place in the exporting country, and to them is added the emissions represented by 
transport and associated costs. This is one implication of the activist critique of ‘embodied carbon’ in the 
calculation of Annex I country emissions: eg J. Kegun, et al, Embodied Carbon in Traded Goods (Winnipeg: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2008), at 
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pursuit of KP goals are the ultimate willingness of taxpayers and consumers in 
Annex I countries to fund the policies which cannot even identify, let alone 
secure, necessary emissions reductions, but the emissions reduction policy itself 
cannot be subjected to rational cost-benefit calculation. It is not irrational to argue 
that one should ignore some non-Annex 1 countries’ emissions as being too small 
to effect global policy. But, of course, it is irrational not to include the emissions 
of the PRC, for this removes the cap on the global system. In sum, in Weber’s 
terms, commitment to the KP, rather than being instrumentally rational, is value 
rational: ‘that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake or 
some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently of its 
prospects of success’.141 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE APPOINTMENT OF THE NEW EXECUTIVE 
SECRETARY OF THE UNFCCC SECRETARIAT 
 
The widespread criticism of the KP as a ‘political’ regulation is generally tedious 
and ineffective, for what important regulatory measure is not a political 
compromise? Nor can it be said that regulatory measures of any importance ever 
have full control of the conditions of their being effective. But the new global 
welfare economics of the KP nevertheless is a regulatory regime which is political 
in an unacceptable sense because, as it has no control whatsoever over the basic 
condition of its success, and, as that condition does not and will not obtain, it can 
proceed only by a disregard of cost-effectiveness which is not economically 
rational but is an act of will, and, in the absence of this rationality, this policy is not 
accountable, for what counts as a good performance? It was the dawning 
realisation of this at COP15, at which the non-Annex 1 emitters stated their firm 
intention never to comply with the KP, subsequently cost the former Executive 
Secretary of the UNFCCC Secretariat his post. 
His replacement is the perfect appointment.142 Ms Christiana Figueres, a 
distinguished Costa Rican public servant, had been a member of the Costa Rican 
UNFCCC negotiating team since 1995 and had served on many international 
environmental and climate change bodies.143 She has made extensive suggestions 
for reform of the CDM.144 The failure of the KP will come as no surprise to her, 
as she has never been particularly concerned about the success of the KP judged 
                                                                                                                                       
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/67904/?view=document. 
141 M. Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968), 24-25.  
142 UNFCC, ‘Christiana Figueres Appointed New UNFCCC Executive Secretary’ (Press Release, 17 May 
2010), at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/application/pdf/100517_press
rel_new_es.pdf.  
143 http://www.figueresonline.com/index.htm.  
144 http://www.figueresonline.com/design.htm.  
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against the target it publicly set itself of effectively preventing DAI. In 2007, 
reviewing what already seemed very disappointing evidence about meeting that 
target, she told us that: 
 
the [...] KP was never meant as the solution to climate change, nor its market 
mechanisms intended as a final product. The KP is limited in its global 
emission reduction target, in its time frame, and in the countries that 
participate. Given the scale of the climate challenge, the KP can only be seen 
as the preamble of an extended and enhanced effort, which should continue 
to rely heavily on market mechanisms in order to manage the costs.145 
 
The KP and the new global welfare economics already have reached a point of 
crisis. If one takes the KP to be designed to avoid DAI, it has been from the 
outset bound to fail, and it is now being seen to be failing. Assessed in terms of 
rational economics and broadly democratic policymaking, it should be abandoned. 
But, of course, this assumes some conventional form of accountability, and the 
appointment of Ms Figueres illustrates that there is a different type of 
policymaking at work in the new global welfare economics, in which a vanguard 
congnoscenti see their role to be to lead those ‘[e]ntrenched in their traditional 
defensive positions’146 to positions the virtue of which they are incapable of 
identifying for themselves. Ms Figueres embodies, in our opinion, the 
unacceptably manipulative attitude to regulation which is characteristic of this 
congoscenti, to whom the KP was only ever a device to encourage the right sort of 
attitude to global warming, and the KP’s complete revision, amounting to the 
abandonment of its recognisable form, can now be undertaken in a sanguine 
frame of mind unhindered by the concern with accountability, economy, and 
efficacy which informs this paper. Remaining certain that ‘[t]oday’s wisdom 
demands higher emission reduction levels than those made possible through the 
current [...] CDM’, Ms Figueres will now change the basic ‘logic’ of the KP, which 
she has long thought obsolete. Her complete disregard of the immense 
expenditure wasted already in pursuit of a goal which cannot be achieved may be 
continued because, from her political perspective, all that is now needed is the 
creation of ‘a new world order’ in which the developing countries, instead of 
posing an intractable problem, will be part of the ‘solutions group’.147 
That the UN is leading the formulation of a ‘policy’ of ‘saving the planet’148 
by establishing a ‘new world order’ which will bring about ‘a wholesale 
reconfiguration of global industry’ by means of a ‘second industrial revolution’ 
opens up an infinite vista of waste. Nevertheless, at some point in the medium 
term, the CDM and the KP will be abandoned. The issue is the way this 
                                                     
145 Figueres and Newcombe, n 20 above, 1. 
146 C. Figueres and C. Streck, ‘The Evolution of the CDM in a Post-2012 Climate Agreement’ (2009) 18 
The Journal of Environment and Development 227, 234.  
147 ibid, 234, 243. 
148 UNDESA, n 31 above. 
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abandonment will be understood, as either the rejection of a policy leading to 
government failure at an unprecedented scope and scale, or a part of a process of 
global welfare economic policy formation which proceeds by being decoupled 
from rational criteria of assessment. We place our hope in Coase’s belief that ‘[t]he 
demand for nonsense seems to be subject to the universal law of demand: we 
demand less of it when the price is higher’.149 
 
                                                     
149 R.H. Coase, ‘Economists and Public Policy’ in R.H. Coase, Essays on Economics and Economists (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 47, 55. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
The following acronyms are used in these notes: 
BRIC: Brasil, Russia, India, China bloc 
CA: Copenhagen Accord 
CCC: UK Committee on Climate Change 
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism 
CDMEB: Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board 
CER: Certified Emissions Reduction 
COP1, COP2, etc: see n 2 above 
DAI: dangerous anthropogenic interference 
DECC: UK Department of Environment and Climate Change 
EC: European Commission 
EEA: European Environment Agency 
EU: European Union 
EUETS: European Union Emissions Trading System 
FCP: First Commitment Period 
GHG: greenhouse gas 
GWP: global warming potential 
HFC: see n 93 above and associated text 
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
KP: Kyoto Protocol 
PRC: People’s Republic of China 
SR: Stern Review 
UK: United Kingdom 
UN: United Nations 
UNDESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USA: United States of America 
